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 NOTE 
Raising the Bar: The Ninth Circuit’s 
Troubling Interpretation of the Federal 
Foreclosure Bar 
Berezovsky v. Moniz, 869 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2017) 
Sarah Rowan* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With sixty-nine million residents in community associations1 and eighty-
nine million dollars in assessments, associations have a prominent role in to-
day’s society.2  In 2017, the Ninth Circuit, in Berezovsky v. Moniz, restricted 
an association’s ability to collect delinquent assessments when it held that the 
association cannot foreclose on its priority position lien without the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency’s (“Agency”) consent.3  In so holding, the court sided 
with the big banks and lenders at the expense of local associations and state 
priority lien laws that have been in effect for twenty to thirty years.  Not only 
does this decision burden associations, but it burdens the millions of homeown-
ers living in those associations as well.  This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit 
erred in holding that the Federal Foreclosure Bar requires the Agency’s consent 
and that, even if it does require Agency consent, the Agency has not already 
impliedly consented.  This Note also discusses the policy implications of the 
Berezovsky decision and of requiring the Agency’s consent before associations 
can foreclose.  The Federal Foreclosure Bar completely undercuts the balance 
that priority lien laws created between lenders and associations, and it effec-
tively prevents associations from enforcing their rights. 
Part II of this Note discusses the facts surrounding the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Berezovsky v. Moniz.4  Part III then describes the role of associa-
 
*B.S., West Virginia University, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2019; Associate Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2018–2019.  I would 
like to extend a special thank you to Professor Wilson Freyermuth and the entire Mis-
souri Law Review staff for their support and guidance in writing this Note. 
 1. “Community associations” refers to planned communities, such as homeown-
ers’ associations, condominium communities, and housing cooperatives. 
 2. CMTY. ASS’NS INST., NATIONAL AND STATE STATISTICAL REVIEW FOR 2016 at 
1 (2016), https://foundation.caionline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2016StatsRe-
viewFBWeb.pdf. 
 3. Berezovsky v. Moniz, 869 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 4. Id. 
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tions and analyzes cases interpreting superpriority liens, the Federal Foreclo-
sure Bar, and the FDIC Exemption.  Part IV explains the Ninth Circuit’s ra-
tionale for holding that an association cannot foreclose on its priority position 
lien without the Agency’s consent.  Finally, Part V discusses why the Ninth 
Circuit should not have held that the Agency’s consent in association priority 
lien foreclosures is required and the implications of requiring the Agency’s 
consent before associations can foreclose. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
In 2007, Gregory and Idell Moniz took out a $220,000 loan to purchase a 
home in Las Vegas, Nevada.5  The loan was secured by a deed of trust with 
Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”) as its beneficiary.6  A few years later, the 
Monizes missed payments owed to the homeowners’ association (“HOA”), 
which governed their home’s community.7  Accordingly, an HOA lien arose 
against the Monizes’ home.8  For the first nine months of unpaid assessments, 
the HOA lien was further entitled under Nevada’s superpriority lien statute to 
priority over BANA’s lien.9  After recording a lien against the home and 
providing a formal notice of default,10 the HOA foreclosed on the Monizes’ 
home.11  Alex Berezovsky purchased the home at the HOA’s foreclosure sale.12  
After purchasing the home, he sued the Monizes and BANA to quiet title in 
 
 5. Id. at 926.  The loan was sold to Freddie Mac in 2007, but Freddie Mac never 
recorded its interest.  Id. at 932. 
 6. Id. at 926.  BANA was the deed-of-trust beneficiary, and Freddie Mac was the 
note owner.  Id. at 933. 
 7. Id. at 926.  The missed payments to the homeowners’ association totaled 
$1767.38.  Id. 
 8. Id.  An HOA lien encumbers the title to a home, and if the debt is not paid off, 
the HOA may “call the lien due and seize your home.”  Ciele Edwards, Tax Liens vs. 
HOA Liens, ZACKS, https://finance.zacks.com/tax-liens-vs-hoa-liens-9939.html (last 
visited May 28, 2018). 
 9. Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 925; see NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.3116(3) (West 
2018) (“A lien under this section is prior to all security interests described in paragraph 
(b) of subsection 2 to the extent of: . . . (b) The unpaid amount of assessments . . . which 
would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the 9 months immediately 
preceding the date on which the notice of default and election to sell is recorded . . . .”).  
Any unpaid assessments beyond the initial nine months were still subject to the HOA 
lien but were subordinate to liens or interests recorded after the Covenants, Conditions, 
and Restrictions (“CCRs”).  Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 925, 931 n.6. 
 10. BANA also received notice.  Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 3, Berezovsky, 869 F.3d 923 (No. 2:15-cv-011860-GMN-GWF). 
 11. Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 926.  If an association forecloses on its lien, all other 
property liens or interests that were recorded after the CCRs attached to the title would 
be extinguished, including the subordinate portion of the HOA lien that went beyond 
nine months of unpaid assessments.  Id. at 925. 
 12. Id. 
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Nevada state court.13  Unknown to Berezovsky – and not shown on the record 
– Freddie Mac had purchased the Monizes’ loan in 2007.14  Freddie Mac then 
intervened and filed a counterclaim for title to the property.15  Armed with 12 
U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) (“Federal Foreclosure Bar”), Freddie Mac removed the 
case to federal court and filed a motion for summary judgment.16  Additionally, 
as Freddie Mac’s conservator, the Agency intervened and joined the motion for 
summary judgment.17 
Freddie Mac and the Agency claimed that § 4617(j)(3) precluded the 
HOA from extinguishing Freddie Mac’s lien, unless the Agency consented to 
the HOA foreclosure of the priority portion of its lien.18  They argued that the 
Agency did not consent to the HOA’s foreclosure of the priority portion of its 
lien; thus, the HOA foreclosure did not extinguish Freddie Mac’s lien.19 
The district court granted Freddie Mac and the Agency’s motion for sum-
mary judgment, determining that the Agency did not consent to the HOA’s 
extinguishment of Freddie Mac’s lien on the property.20  Berezovsky appealed, 
arguing that the Federal Foreclosure Bar does not apply to private association 
foreclosures and that because Freddie Mac and the Agency did not take any 
action to stop the sale, they implicitly consented to the foreclosure.21  In the 
alternative, Berezovsky argued that Freddie Mac did not have a property inter-
est that was enforceable.22  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and 
held that Freddie Mac possessed an enforceable property interest, Freddie Mac 
was under Agency conservatorship at the time of the foreclosure sale, and ul-
timately, the Federal Foreclosure Bar protected the deed of trust from being 
extinguished without the Agency’s consent.23 
 
 13. Id. at 926. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.  Freddie Mac produced evidence showing that it owned the Monizes’ loan 
and that BANA was Freddie Mac’s loan-servicing agent.  Id. 
 17. Id.  As conservator, the Agency owns and controls Freddie Mac’s assets.  Id. 
at 926–27; see Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–289, §§ 
1311, 1313, 122 Stat. 2654, 2261–62, 2664 (2008) (giving Agency the power to place 
entities, such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, into conservatorship and to participate 
in litigation). 
 18. Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 927; see also 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) (2012) (“No 
property of the Agency shall be subject to levy, attachment, garnishment, foreclosure, 
or sale without the consent of the Agency, nor shall any involuntary lien attach to the 
property of the Agency.”). 
 19. Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 927, 933. 
 20. Id. at 927. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 933. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part discusses the role of associations, superpriority liens, and FDIC 
receiverships.  It also analyzes court decisions that have interpreted superprior-
ity liens and the FDIC exemption. 
A.  Community Associations 
Associations oversee common areas and property interests, offer services 
for owners, and help cultivate a feeling of community through social activities 
and/or amenities.24  In 2016, there were 342,000 associations in the United 
States, which housed sixty-nine million residents or 21.3% of the U.S. popula-
tion.25  The number of associations varies widely by state.26  For example, Flor-
ida had 47,900 associations, while Alaska had fewer than 1000 associations in 
2016.27  Missouri had 5400 associations with an estimated 1,089,000 residents 
in 2016.28  The number of associations in the United States is estimated to have 
increased to 345,000–347,000 in 2017.29 
Moreover, with $88 billion in assessments collected from homeowners 
across the country, associations have a role in both the national economy and 
in people’s lives.30 Assessments may go towards costs such as landscape, 
maintenance of common areas, snow removal, garbage collection, street light-
ing, amenities (pool, golf, exercise room, etc.), police patrol, and even insur-
ance.31  Condominium communities are slightly different because common ar-
eas are owned by all community members.32  Accordingly, condo assessments 
typically go towards building exteriors, roofs, roads, common areas, sewage, 
and parking lots.33  Moreover, associations will also maintain a reserve fund 
 
 24. CMTY. ASS’NS INST., AN INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LIVING 
4 (2017), https://www.caionline.org/HomeownerLeaders/ResourcesforHomeowner-
Leaders/community_association_living.pdf. 
 25. CMTY. ASS’NS INST., supra note 2.  Community associations refer to planned 
communities, such as homeowners’ associations, condominium communities, and 
housing cooperatives.  Id.  Of the totals, 51–55% are homeowners’ associations, 42–
45% are condominium communities, and 3–4% are cooperatives.  Id. 
 26. Id. at 2. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1. 
 30. Id. at 3. 
 31. CMTY. ASS’NS INST., supra note 24, at 18. 
 32. Tony Guerra, What Is an Assessment in a Condo Association?, SFGATE,  
http://homeguides.sfgate.com/assessment-condo-association-57821.html (last visited 
May 28, 2018). 
 33. Id. 
4
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for future and/or unanticipated expenses and to cover unpaid assessments po-
tentially.34 
Associations are also susceptible to economic downturn.  During the 
mortgage crisis of 2007–2010, many homeowners defaulted on their mort-
gages, foreclosure rates went up, and home values crashed.35  As a result, many 
borrowers went underwater on their mortgages.36 Unsurprisingly, in tough eco-
nomic times, association assessments were not being paid either.37  Moreover, 
when lenders foreclosed on a property, there was not enough equity in the prop-
erty to satisfy both the mortgage lien and the association lien.38  Therefore, 
unpaid assessments were not being satisfied by the foreclosure, and the associ-
ations were left with a strained operating budget and potentially increased as-
sessments for other homeowners in the association.39  A limited priority posi-
tion for an association’s lien would provide some protection from adverse mar-
ket forces and help soften the blow during economic downturns.40 
B.  The Superpriority Lien 
Generally, “first in time, first in right” governs the priority of liens.41  In 
other words, the first lien to attach to a property has a priority position over 
liens that attach afterwards.42  However, statutes that regulate lien priorities can 
change the general first in time, first in right rule.43  For example, the Nevada 
statute at issue in Berezovsky created a superpriority lien for association assess-
ments.44 
 
 34. Casey Perkins, Note, Privatopia in Distress: The Impact of the Foreclosure 
Crisis on Homeowners’ Associations, 10 NEV. L.J. 561, 565 (2010). 
 35. See John V. Duca, Subprime Mortgage Crisis, FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 22, 
2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/subprime_mortgage_crisis.  Even 
as of April 2018, one in every 2058 housing units was in foreclosure.  See U.S. Real 
Estate Trends & Market Info, REALTYTRAC (Apr. 2018), http://www.real-
tytrac.com/statsandtrends/foreclosuretrends. 
 36. Diana Olick, Underwater Mortgage: CNBC Explains, CNBC (Apr. 24, 2013, 
10:52 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/100543831.  A mortgage is underwater when 
“the amount of the mortgage is greater than the current value of the home.”  Id. 
 37. Perkins, supra note 34, at 570. 
 38. Id. at 567. 
 39. Id. at 568. 
 40. Id. at 569. 
 41. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Liens § 70 (2018). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Berezovsky v. Moniz, 869 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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A superpriority lien elevates an association’s lien for the first six months45 
of assessments to a position above other creditors, such as a mortgage lender.46  
In effect, a superpriority lien splits an association’s entire lien into two por-
tions, with six months of delinquent assessments getting priority over a first 
mortgage and the remaining unpaid assessments receiving a junior position to 
the mortgage.47  The goal is to “strik[e] an equitable balance between the need 
to enforce collection of unpaid assessments and the need to protect the priority 
of the security interests of lenders.”48 
Superpriority liens for associations stem from section 3-116 of the Uni-
form Common Interest Ownership Act of 1982 (“UCIOA”).49  The UCIOA 
attempts to make uniform law among the states regarding common interest 
communities.50  Comments to the UCIOA compare an association lien to other 
liens – such as liens for real estate taxes – because an association gets its reve-
nue primarily, if not only, from common assessments.51  Moreover, associa-
tions, rather than the public government, may be responsible for collecting 
trash and maintaining roads and parks.52  Thus, association assessments are 
comparable to property taxes, and property tax liens typically have priority 
over all other liens.53 
As of the time of this Note, eleven states have adopted a version of the 
UCIOA, which applies to condominiums, planned communities, and real estate 
cooperatives.54  Fourteen states have enacted the Uniform Condominium Act 
(“UCA”), which only applies to condominium associations.55  In some states, 
such as Nevada, the statute applies to an HOA’s unpaid assessments for up to 
 
 45. The Nevada superpriority lien prioritizes the first nine months of association 
assessments.  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.3116(2)–(3) (West 2018). 
 46. Aušra Gaigalaitė, Note, Priority of Condominium Associations’ Assessment 
Liens Vis-à-Vis Mortgages: Navigating in the Super-Priority Lien Jurisdictions, 40 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 841, 843–44 (2017). 
 47. R. Wilson Freyermuth & Dale A. Whitman, Can Associations Have Priority 
over Fannie and Freddie?, 29 PROB. & PROP. 27, 27 (2015).  A foreclosure of a priority 
position lien results in the termination of all junior liens.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1997). 
 48. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3–116, cmt. 2 (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.  STATE LAWS 2014). 
 49. See UNIFORM COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3–116 (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.  STATE LAWS 1982). 
 50. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, 334 P.3d 408, 410 (Nev. 2014) (en banc). 
 51. Id. at 413. 
 52. James L. Winokur, Meaner Lienor Community Associations: The “Super Pri-
ority” Lien and Related Reforms Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, 
27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 360–61 (1992). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Uniform Acts by State, CMTY. ASS’NS INST., https://www.caionline.org/Advo-
cacy/StateAdvocacy/PriorityIssues/UniformActs/Pages/default.aspx (last visited May 
28, 2018). 
 55. Id. 
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nine months.56  In other states, like Missouri, the statute only applies to condo-
minium associations for six months of unpaid assessments.57  All other unpaid 
assessments, after the six or nine months, remain in a junior position to the 
lender’s mortgage or to a first deed of trust.58  Regardless of which statute a 
state enacts, the goal is still to “strik[e] an equitable balance between the need 
to enforce collection of unpaid assessments and the need to protect the priority 
of the security interests of lenders.”59 
Nevada’s superpriority lien law, NRS 116.3116, stems from the Uniform 
Common Interest Ownership Act of 1982 (“UCIOA”).60  NRS 116.3116(2) 
states that an HOA “lien . . . is prior to all other liens and encumbrances on a 
unit except: . . . [a] first security interest.”61  Then, it adds that the lien “is prior 
to all [first] security interests . . . to the extent of: . . . The unpaid amount of 
assessments . . . which would have become due in the absence of acceleration 
during the 9 months immediately preceding the date on which the notice of 
default and election to sell is recorded.”62 
There is a division between Nevada district courts on whether a true pri-
ority lien is established by NRS 116.3116.63  For example, multiple district 
courts have held that when an HOA forecloses on its superpriority lien, junior 
interests, including a first deed of trust, are extinguished.64  Conversely, other 
courts have held that the foreclosure of the HOA superpriority liens does not 
extinguish an earlier-recorded first mortgage, nor does the foreclosure of an 
earlier-recorded first mortgage extinguish the HOA lien.65 
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Nevada, in SFR Investments Pool 1 v. US 
Bank, determined whether NRS 116.3116 was a true priority lien or whether it 
only created a payment priority between the HOA and beneficiary of the first 
deed of trust.66  The court determined that NRS 116.3116(2) splits an HOA lien 
 
 56. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.3116(2)–(3) (West 2018). 
 57. MO. REV. STAT. § 448.3–116.2(3) (2016). 
 58. See Freyermuth & Whitman, supra note 47, at 27. 
 59. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3–116, cmt. 2 (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.  STATE LAWS 2014). 
 60. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, 334 P.3d 408, 410 (Nev. 2014) (en banc). 
 61. § 116.3116(2). 
 62. Id. § 116.3116(3). 
 63. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 334 P.3d at 412. 
 64. See 7912 Limbwood Court Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 
1149 (D. Nev. 2013); see also Cape Jasmine Court Tr. v. Cent. Mortg. Co., No. 2:13–
CV–1125–APG–CWH, 2014 WL 1305015, at *4 (D. Nev. 2014). 
 65. See Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Alessi & Koenig, LLC, 962 F. Supp. 2d 
1222, 1225 (D. Nev. 2013) (“The super-priority amount is senior to an earlier-recorded 
first mortgage in the sense that it must be satisfied before a first mortgage upon its own 
foreclosure, but it is in parity with an earlier-recorded first mortgage with respect to 
extinguishment, i.e., the foreclosure of neither extinguishes the other.”); see also Weep-
ing Hollow Ave. Tr. v. Spencer, No. 2:13–CV–00544–JCM–VCF, 2013 WL 2296313, 
at *5 (D. Nev. 2013), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 831 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
 66. SFR Invs. Pool 1, 334 P.3d at 412. 
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into a superpriority piece and a subpriority piece.67  The last nine months of 
HOA dues, maintenance, and nuisance-abatement charges make up the super-
priority piece and are “prior to” a first deed of trust.  All other HOA fees or 
assessments are subordinate to a first deed of trust, making them the subpriority 
piece.68 
If the superpriority lien is a true priority lien, an HOA could foreclose on 
it, which would result in an extinguishment of the first deed of trust.69  The 
court examined official comments to the UCIOA, which note that the “split-
lien” approach is designed to “enforce collection of unpaid assessments and 
the obvious necessity for protecting the priority of the security interests of lend-
ers.”70  Moreover, the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”) established a Joint 
Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts, which published a report in 
2013 about the priority lien.71  The report, like the comments to the UCIOA, 
further supports the proposition that the UCIOA established a true priority 
lien.72  Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that NRS 116.3116 es-
tablished a true superpriority lien, and the HOA’s lien could be foreclosed non-
judicially.73 
After the court’s decision in SFR Investments Pool 1, Freddie Mac issued 
an announcement to its servicers.74  The announcement reminded servicers to 
pay HOA and condominium assessments that take priority, or may take prior-
ity, over Freddie Mac’s lien – pursuant to Section 66.22 of its guidelines, Ex-
penses that May Become First Liens on the Property.75 
Similarly, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a condo-
minium association’s foreclosure on a condominium for unpaid dues extin-
guished the first mortgager’s deed of trust.76  The District of Columbia has a 
 
 67. Id. at 411. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 412. 
 71. Id. at 413. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 414.  After the Berezovsky v. Moniz decision, the Nevada Supreme Court 
subsequently held that the Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts NRS 116.3113 and that 
the FHFA did not consent to the extinguishment of Fannie Mae’s property interest by 
failing to act.  Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9641 Christine View v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 
No. 69419, 2018 WL 1448731, at *3 (Nev. 2018). 
 74. See FREDDIE MAC, BULLETIN NO. 2014-20 at 3 (Nov. 17, 2014), www.fred-
diemac.com/singlefamily/guide/bulletins/pdf/bll1420.pdf. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Chase Plaza Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 98 A.3d 166, 178 
(D.C. 2014); see also Trademark Props. of Mich., LLC v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 863 
N.W.2d 344, 347–48 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (ruling in favor of a plaintiff who pur-
chased a condominium unit at a sheriff’s sale after an association foreclosed the prop-
erty). 
8
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condominium act that provides for a six-month priority lien for the associa-
tion.77  The District’s Condominium Act is similar to Nevada’s and is also 
rooted in the UCOIA and the Uniform Condominium Act (“UCA”).78  In so 
holding, the court looked to the language of the act and decided that it estab-
lished a superpriority lien for the most recent six months of assessments.79  Fur-
ther, the court noted that “liens with lower priority are extinguished if a valid 
foreclosure sale yields proceeds insufficient to satisfy a higher-priority lien,” 
which is a general principle of foreclosure law.80  Therefore, looking at the 
act’s language and basic principles of foreclosure law, the conclusion that the 
association’s foreclosure extinguished the mortgager’s first deed of trust fol-
lows.81  If the District of Columbia Council intended to depart from basic fore-
closure principles, as the mortgager argued, the Council would have explicitly 
done so.82  Lastly, the court discussed how the act was based on the UCA and 
UCOIA, which recognize the understanding that a first deed of trust could be 
extinguished by a foreclosure on the superpriority lien.83 
After decisions were issued determining that associations have a true pri-
ority lien that can be foreclosed, as in SFR Investments Pool 1, lenders devel-
oped new arguments to try and reclaim their lost assets.84  One such argument, 
based on the Federal Foreclosure Bar, was that a first mortgage or first deed of 
trust could not be extinguished by an association’s foreclosure without the 
Agency’s consent.85  The Federal Foreclosure Bar states that “[n]o property of 
the Agency shall be subject to levy, attachment, garnishment, foreclosure, or 
sale without the consent of the Agency, nor shall any involuntary lien attach to 
the property of the Agency.”86 
In Federal National Mortgage Association, the United States District 
Court for the District of Nevada accepted the argument based on the Federal 
Foreclosure Bar and held that it prevents Nevada’s superpriority lien statute 
 
 77. Chase Plaza Condo. Ass’n, 98 A.3d at 178. 
 78. See id. at 174. 
 79. Id. at 173.  The court looked at the Act’s language, which stated that “[t]he 
lien shall also be prior to a [first] mortgage or [first] deed of trust . . . to the extent of 
the common expense assessments . . . which would have become due in the absence of 
acceleration during the [six] months immediately preceding institution of an action to 
enforce the lien.” Id. (second and third alterations in original); see also D.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 42–1903.13(a)(2) (West 2018). 
 80. Chase Plaza Condo. Ass’n, 98 A.3d at 173. 
 81. Id. at 174. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 174–75. 
 84. See Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, No. 2:14–cv–02046–
JAD–PAL, 2015 WL 5723647, at *1 (D. Nev. Sept. 28, 2015); see also SFR Invs. Pool 
1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, 334 P.3d 408 (Nev. 2014) (en banc). 
 85. See Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 2015 WL 5723647, at *1. 
 86. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) (2012). 
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from extinguishing Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac’s interest without the Agency’s 
consent.87 
C.  The FDIC Exemption 
The language of the Federal Foreclosure Bar is identical to the language 
of § 1825(b)(2) (“FDIC Exemption”), which governs the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation (“FDIC”).88  The FDIC Exemption states that “[w]hen 
acting as a receiver . . . . [n]o property of the Corporation shall be subject to 
levy, attachment, garnishment, foreclosure, or sale without the consent of the 
Corporation, nor shall any involuntary lien attach to the property of the Corpo-
ration.”89  The only difference between the two statutes is that in the Federal 
Foreclosure Bar the word “Corporation” is replaced with “Agency.”90  So while 
the Federal Foreclosure Bar may have first been interpreted by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Berezovsky, the FDIC Exemption has been interpreted by courts for 
years.91  Accordingly, the Agency’s argument invoking the Federal Foreclo-
sure Bar relates to cases regarding the FDIC Exemption because the statutes 
have identical language.92 
The FDIC resolves failing banks and thrifts to try to recover the FDIC’s 
investments in the institution and treat stakeholders fairly.93  Furthermore, Con-
gress has “conferred expansive powers to ensure the efficiency of the pro-
cess.”94  In fact, in a matter of weeks or months, FDIC receivership takes a 
failed bank and either sells its assets or gets another bank to take them over.95  
The FDIC Exemption effectively functions as a “temporary stay,” which halts 
creditor distractions and allows the FDIC to complete its job more efficiently.96 
The FDIC’s success in rehabilitating or resolving banks and thrifts led 
Congress to use the same basis in authorizing the Agency’s conservatorship 
 
 87. See Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 2015 WL 5723647, at *3. 
 88. Berezovsky v. Moniz, 869 F.3d 923, 928 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 89. 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b) (2012). 
 90. Compare § 4617(j)(3), with § 1825(b). 
 91. See, e.g., Matagorda Cty. v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 92. Compare § 4617(j)(3), with § 1825(b)(2). 
 93. Michael Krimminger & Mark A. Calabria, The Conservatorships of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac: Actions Violate HERA and Established Insolvency Principles 2 
(CATO, Working Paper No. 26/CMFA No. 2, 2015), https://ob-
ject.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/working-paper-26_1.pdf. 
 94. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK 26 (Dec. 23, 2014), 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/resolutions_handbook.pdf (empha-
sis added). 
 95. Freyermuth & Whitman, supra note 47, at 28. 
 96. Id. 
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss2/10
2018] RAISING THE BAR 465 
powers over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Housing and Economic Re-
covery Act of 2008 (“HERA”).97  However, in stark contrast to FDIC receiv-
erships, the FDIC’s conservatorship is going on nine years.98  Moreover, the 
Agency conservatorship shows no signs of ending soon.99 
In Matagorda County v. Russell Law, the Fifth Circuit upheld the FDIC 
Exemption and determined that a local government’s property tax lien was 
barred from foreclosure without the FDIC’s consent.100  However, the court 
noted that the postponement of the ability to collect on the tax lien was “a se-
vere impairment of those assets.”101  The “delay in the exercise of a valuable 
property right” was not enough to constitute a compensable taking at this 
point.102  However, a compensable taking may occur at some point if there is 
“unmitigated delay” and reduced investment-backed expectations.103 
In FDIC v. McFarland, the Fifth Circuit held that “private entities pos-
sessing normal judgment liens . . .are not barred by section 1825(b)(2), [the 
FDIC Exemption].”104  In so holding, the court analyzed the FDIC Exemption 
by looking to the structure and purpose of the statute.105  The court noted how, 
before the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989 (“FIRREA”) 12 U.S.C. § 1825 only included § 1825(a), which exempted 
the FDIC from taxation when it was in its corporate capacity.106  Then, the 
court held that § 1825(b) was added to extend the tax exemption to the FDIC 
when it is a receiver.107 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In Berezovsky, the Ninth Circuit held that the Federal Foreclosure Bar 
immunizes Agency property from being extinguished without the Agency’s 
consent.108  According to the court, the HOA never obtained the Agency’s con-
sent before foreclosing on the priority portion of the HOA’s lien, and therefore, 
the property’s deed of trust was protected from extinguishment.109 
 
 97. Krimminger & Calabria, supra note 93, at 2. 
 98. Conservatorship, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, https://www.fhfa.gov/Conser-
vatorship (last visited May 28, 2018).  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into 
conservatorships on September 6, 2008.  Id. 
 99. Freyermuth & Whitman, supra note 47, at 28. 
 100. Matagorda Cty. v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d 215, 225 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 101. Id. at 224–25. 
 102. Id. at 225. 
 103. Id. 
 104. FDIC v. McFarland, 243 F.3d 876, 886 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 105. Id. at 885. 
 106. Id. at 886. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Berezovsky v. Moniz, 869 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 109. Id. at 933. 
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The court first determined that the Federal Foreclosure Bar applies to pri-
vate foreclosures.110  The court looked to the statute’s structure and plain lan-
guage.111  According to the court, the first section of the Federal Foreclosure 
Bar makes it clear on its face that the subsections of § 4617(j) apply to “‘any 
case’ in which the Agency serves as conservator, without limitation.”112  More-
over, the court noted that while the second subsection is limited to taxation, the 
third subsection, titled “Property protection,”113 is not limited to taxation.114  In 
fact, the court determined that foreclosure under the “Property protection” sub-
section is not limited to any “subset of foreclosure types.”115 
Further, the court distinguished its holding from that in McFarland, 
which did not apply the FDIC Exemption to private foreclosures.116  In Bere-
zovsky, the court stated that the statutory framework in the FDIC Exemption is 
distinguishable from the framework in the Federal Foreclosure Bar.117  Specif-
ically, the court noted that before FIRREA in 1989, the FDIC Exemption only 
included § 1825(a),118 which exempts the FDIC from all taxation.119  The court 
concluded that the addition of § 1825(b)120 was designed to address tax exemp-
tions that were not previously addressed in § 1825(a), specifically when the 
FDIC is acting as a receiver.121  Further, the court pointed out the title of § 
1825, which is “Exemption from taxation; limitations on borrowing.”122  Be-
cause the court in Berezovsky found that § 4617(j) does not include language 
that limits its applicability to taxation,123 the court held that the Federal Fore-
closure Bar is not limited to tax liens.124   
 
 110. Id. at 929. 
 111. Id. at 927. 
 112. Id. at 928; see also 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j) (2012). 
 113. The subsection titled “Property protection” is the Federal Foreclosure Bar.  Be-
rezovsky, 869 F.3d at 928. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 928–29; see also FDIC v. McFarland, 243 F.3d 876, 886 (5th Cir. 2001).  
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(“FIRREA”) governs FDIC receiverships.  Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 928.  The language 
of the FDIC Exemption is identical to the Federal Foreclosure Bar, except that “Corpo-
ration” appears in the place of “Agency” in the FDIC Exemption.  Id. 
 117. Berezovsky, 869 F.3d 928–29. 
 118. Id. at 929.  Section 1825(a) is titled the “General rule.” See 12 U.S.C. § 1825(a) 
(2012). 
 119. Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 929; see § 1825(a). 
 120. Section 1825(b) is titled “Other exemptions.”  See § 1825(b). 
 121. Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 929. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Section 4617 is titled “Authority over critically undercapitalized regulated en-
tities.”  See 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (2012).  Section 4617(j) is titled “Other Agency exemp-
tions,” which applies to the Agency as a conservator or a receiver.  See § 4617(j).  Sec-
tion 4617(j)(2) is titled “Taxation,” and § 4617(j)(3) is titled “Property protection.”  See 
§ 4617(j)(2)–(3). 
 124. Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 929. 
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Next, the court explicitly denied Berezovsky’s argument that the Agency 
implicitly consented to the HOA foreclosure because neither Freddie Mac nor 
the Agency took any action to stop it.125  In doing so, the court noted that Be-
rezovsky produced no authority to support his position.126  Moreover, the court 
held that the statutory language of the Federal Foreclosure Bar does not require 
active resistance to the foreclosure by the Agency;127 rather, the Federal Fore-
closure Bar flatly protects Agency property “unless or until the Agency affirm-
atively relinquishes” that protection.128  Ultimately, the court found that the 
Agency did not relinquish its property interest.129 
The court then determined whether the Federal Foreclosure Bar 
preempted Nevada state law.130  First, the court concluded that the Federal 
Foreclosure Bar does not expressly preempt Nevada’s superpriority lien be-
cause the language Congress used was not “sufficiently definite” to be consid-
ered expressly preemptive.131  Next, the court found that the Federal Foreclo-
sure Bar’s language “unequivocally expresses” Congress’s intent to supersede 
any state or contrary law that permits foreclosure of Agency property without 
its consent.132  Moreover, the court noted that the Federal Foreclosure Bar pro-
hibits Agency property from being foreclosed without Agency consent, but Ne-
vada’s superpriority lien law permits HOA foreclosures that would extinguish 
an Agency’s lien without the Agency’s consent.133  Therefore, the court deter-
mined that the Federal Foreclosure Bar impliedly preempts and supersedes Ne-
vada’s superpriority lien statute because the Federal Foreclosure Bar is an “ob-
stacle to Congress’s clear and manifest goal of protecting the Agency’s as-
sets.”134 
Lastly, the court determined that Freddie Mac had a valid and enforceable 
property interest under Nevada law.135  The court recognized that while BANA, 
the deed-of-trust beneficiary, was listed on the recording document, Freddie 
Mac, the note owner, was omitted from the recorded deed of trust.136  However, 
the court determined that Nevada law recognizes a note owner as a secured 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See § 4617(j)(3) (“No property of the Agency shall be subject to . . . foreclo-
sure, or sale without the consent of the Agency . . . .”). 
 128. Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 929. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 930; see Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 455, 458 (2012) (find-
ing “in addition to, or different than those made under this [Act] may not be imposed 
by any state” to be expressly preemptive language (alteration in original)). 
 132. Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 930–31.  The court referred to the language of the 
Federal Foreclosure Bar, which stated “[n]o property of the Agency shall be subject to 
. . . foreclosure.”  Id. (alteration in original). 
 133. Id. at 931. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 932. 
 136. Id. 
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creditor with a property interest, even if the owner’s agent is the only name on 
the recorded deed of trust.137  As such, the court affirmed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Freddie Mac.138 
V.  COMMENT 
As discussed above, the court in Berezovsky accepted the argument that 
the Agency’s consent is required before an association can foreclose on its pri-
ority lien.139  In requiring the Agency’s consent, “the Federal government pro-
tects big banks at the expense of local community associations by compromis-
ing state priority lien laws that have been in place in many states for 20–30 
years.”140  First, this Part discusses how the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that 
the Federal Foreclosure Bar requires the Agency’s consent and that, even if it 
does require Agency consent, the Agency has not already impliedly consented.  
Next, this Part discusses the policy implications of the Berezovsky decision and 
of requiring the Agency’s consent before associations can foreclose.  
A. The Ninth Circuit Erred in Its Decision  
The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the Federal Foreclosure Bar re-
quires the Agency’s consent in association priority lien foreclosures because it 
is a deprivation of due process, and the Federal Foreclosure Bar does not pre-
clude foreclosures by private party liens.  Moreover, even if the Federal Fore-
closure Bar does apply, the Agency apparently consented to the association 
foreclosures. 
One argument against using the Federal Foreclosure Bar as a defense is 
that is it a deprivation of due process.141  The Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution states that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of . . . property, 
without due process of law.”142  Deprivation occurs “when a governmental ac-
tor significantly alters or eliminates property rights recognized by state law.”143 
In Matagorda, the appellants argued that the FDIC had effectively 
“taken” their property without just compensation through the FDIC’s use of 
 
 137. Id.  In regard to the Monizes’ loan, BANA is Freddie Mac’s agent.  Id. at 933. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 931. 
 140. Dawn Bauman, Senator Warren (D-MA) Leads the Massachusetts Congres-
sional Delegation to Question FHFA’s Attack on Community Associa-
tions, COMMUNITY ASS’NS INST. (June 2, 2016), https://advocacy.caionline.org/sena-
tor-warren-d-ma-leads-the-massachusetts-congressional-delegation-to-question-fhfas-
attack-on-community-associations/. 
 141. Freyermuth & Whitman, supra note 47, at 29. 
 142. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 143. Freyermuth & Whitman, supra note 47, at 29. 
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the FDIC Exemption to prevent municipalities from foreclosing on real prop-
erty tax liens during FDIC receiverships.144  While the court rejected the ap-
pellants’ argument at this point, it noted that because of the “indeterminate 
postponement” before the appellants could collect on its tax lien, the FDIC 
Exemption severely impaired the appellants’ assets.145  Moreover, “[u]nmiti-
gated delay, coupled with diminishment of distinct investment-backed expec-
tations, may, at some point, infringe on the entire ‘bundle’ of rights enjoyed by 
the Appellants to the point that a compensable taking occurs.”146 
Seeing that the Agency’s conservatorship is now approaching nine years 
and there is no way to know when it will end, the conservatorship constitutes 
unmitigated delay.147  Moreover, property interests are created by state law, 
and Nevada law gives the HOA a superpriority lien for unpaid assessments.148  
If the Federal Foreclosure Bar prevents associations from extinguishing 
Agency liens, then an association can only foreclose on the subpriority portion 
of its lien.  However, foreclosing on a subpriorty lien would be worthless be-
cause no, or very few, buyers would purchase a home still subject to a mortgage 
lien.  Moreover, the Federal Foreclosure Bar contains no procedure for obtain-
ing Agency consent.149  In the FDIC context, the consent section acts as a tem-
porary stay on foreclosures while the FDIC obtains consent through defined 
procedure.150  The consent requirement for the Agency is more restrictive, 
however, due to the length of the Agency’s conservatorship so far and the lack 
of procedure.  Therefore, by interpreting the Federal Foreclosure Bar to require 
associations to obtain the Agency’s consent before foreclosing on its priority 
portion of its lien, the Ninth Circuit has essentially taken away the HOA prop-
erty right. 
Second, the Federal Foreclosure Bar only precludes foreclosures by “any 
State, county, municipality, or local taxing authority,”151 rather than private 
party liens.  The Federal Foreclosure Bar exempts the Agency from “all taxa-
tion imposed by any State, county, municipality, or local taxing authority” in 
 
 144. Matagorda Cty. v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 145. Id. at 224–25. 
 146. Id. at 225; see also Simon v. Cebrick, 53 F.3d 17, 24 (3d Cir. 1995) (agreeing 
with the Matagorda court “that at some point a delay in the ability to exercise property 
rights may constitute a compensable taking”). 
 147. Freyermuth & Whitman, supra note 47, at 30.  The conservatorship remains 
in full force today and has been in effect since it was signed into law by President 
George W. Bush on July 30, 2008. See Conservatorship, supra note 98. 
 148. Berezovsky v. Moniz, 869 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Bd. of Re-
gents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“Property interests . . . . are 
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem 
from an independent source such as state law . . . .”). 
 149. Freyermuth & Whitman, supra note 47, at 29.  On the other hand, 28 U.S.C. § 
2410(c) provides a procedure for obtaining consent, as required by the FDIC Exemp-
tion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c) (2012). 
 150. Freyermuth & Whitman, supra note 47, at 28. 
 151. See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(2) (2012). 
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section (j)(2).152  In section (j)(4), the Federal Foreclosure Bar provides that 
“[t]he Agency shall not be liable for any amounts in the nature of penalties or 
fines, including those arising from . . . recording tax or any recording or filing 
fees when due.”153  In between those two sections stands § 4617(j)(3).154  Ra-
ther than taking § 4617(j)(3) out of context, it should be read with the statute 
as a whole and should apply to tax-related liens.  Because, in interpreting a 
statute, “[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by 
reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is 
used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”155 
Notably, the Fifth Circuit in McFarland interpreted the FDIC Exemption 
– which has the exact same language as the Federal Foreclosure Bar – to 
“merely extend[] the general exemption of the FDIC from taxation to the re-
ceivership context.”156  Accordingly, the court held that the FDIC Exemption 
does not bar claims by private entities’ judgment liens but only prohibits “state 
and local taxing authorities from foreclosing on property subject to an FDIC 
lien without its consent.”157  The court came to this determination, in part, after 
reading the sections “in context, cognizant of the statute’s structure and pur-
pose.”158  When using the FDIC Exemption to interpret the Federal Foreclosure 
Bar, the McFarland decision indicates that the Federal Foreclosure Bar also 
applies only to state and local taxing authorities.  Accordingly, a private party’s 
– such as a homeowners’ association – claim is not barred by the Federal Fore-
closure Bar.159 
Additionally, even if the Federal Foreclosure Bar does apply to the asso-
ciation foreclosure, as Berezovsky argued, the Agency already apparently con-
sented to association foreclosures.160  The court stated that Berezovsky cited 
no authority to support the notion that inaction conveys consent and further 
noted that the Federal Foreclosure Bar does “not require the Agency to actively 
resist foreclosure.”161  In doing so, the court ignored the Agency’s past behav-
ior.  “Even when the person concerned does not in fact agree to the conduct of 
the other, his words or acts or even his inaction may manifest a consent that 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. § 4617(j)(4). 
 154. See id. § 4617(j)(3). 
 155. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). 
 156. FDIC v. McFarland, 243 F.3d 876, 886 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 885–86 (stating that § 1825(b)(2) represents Congress’ will that the FDIC 
must consent before any property deprivation that is initiated by a state). 
 159. Freyermuth & Whitman, supra note 47, at 32. 
 160. See Berezovsky v. Moniz, 869 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Frey-
ermuth & Whitman, supra note 47, at 30; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(2) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to 
be intended as consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent 
in fact.”). 
 161. See Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 929. 
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will justify the other in acting in reliance upon them.”162  For one, the Agency 
impliedly consents when it purchases loans subject to state law priority and lien 
enforcement rules.163  Moreover, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have recog-
nized the association’s priority liens in their servicing guidelines.  For example, 
the 2015 Fannie Mae Servicing Guide states that Fannie’s servicers need to 
“take all reasonable actions to prevent new liens that would be superior to Fan-
nie Mae’s mortgage lien from being attached against property.”164  Notably, 
after the decision in SFR Investments Pool 1, Freddie Mac issued an announce-
ment reminding servicers to make sure its mortgage was not adversely af-
fected.165  The announcement listed paying association assessments that are 
superior to Freddie Mac’s lien as a way to protect its mortgage.166  The afore-
mentioned guidelines and announcement would be pointless if Agency prop-
erty required its consent before associations could foreclose on its priority lien. 
Additionally, for the first six years of the Agency’s conservatorship, the 
Agency did not present the Federal Foreclosure Bar argument to prevent asso-
ciation lien foreclosure.167  In fact, the Agency, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac 
have partaken in litigation regarding the validity of an association’s priority 
lien in the past – without bringing up the Federal Foreclosure Bar.168  This is 
another example of the Agency consenting to state law lien priorities. 
B.  Policy Implications 
The following discusses (1) the implications of the Berezovsky decision, 
(2) why lenders are in a better position to safeguard their interests, and (3) how 
the Federal Foreclosure Bar creates an impossible trap for associations.  
 
 162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (em-
phasis added). 
 163. Freyermuth & Whitman, supra note 47, at 30. 
 164. Id. (quoting FANNIE MAE, SERVICING GUIDE: FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY 391 
(Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/svc011415.pdf); see also 
FANNIE MAE, FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY 2012 SERVICING GUIDE 302-2 (Mar. 14, 
2012), https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/svc031412.pdf; FANNIE MAE, 
FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY 2011 SERVICING GUIDE 302-2 (June 10, 2011), 
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/svc061011.pdf (“When the HOA of a PUD 
or condo project notifies the servicer that a borrower is 60 days’ delinquent in the pay-
ment of assessments or charges levied by the association, the servicer should advance 
the funds to pay the charges if necessary to protect the priority of Fannie Mae’s mort-
gage lien.  If the project is located in a state that has adopted the Uniform Condominium 
Act (UCA), the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA), or a similar stat-
ute that provides for up to six months of delinquent regular condo assessments to have 
lien priority over the mortgage lien, Fannie Mae will reimburse the servicer for up to 
six months of such advances.”). 
 165. See FREDDIE MAC, supra note 74, at 3. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Freyermuth & Whitman, supra note 47, at 31. 
 168. Id.; see, e.g., Trademark Props. of Mich., LLC v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 863 
N.W.2d 344, 351 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014). 
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The Berezovsky decision greatly impacts homeowners’ associations and 
their residents.  Associations need to collect assessments to fund their func-
tions, such as collecting trash and maintaining roads and parks.169  Moreover, 
association assessments protect the collateral, which secures the mortgage 
loans.170  Notably, the general counsel of Freddie Mac discussed the impact 
when associations do not receive their assessments.171  He noted that non-pay-
ments threaten condominiums, which affects property values and in return, af-
fects the interests of unit owners, mortgage lenders, and the surrounding com-
munity.172  Community banks also recognize the benefits superpriority liens 
provide to common interest communities, homeowners, and lenders.173 
If associations are required to wait until the Agency consents or fore-
closes, it is the paying homeowners in the associations that will bear the brunt 
of this decision.  Without the ability to collect assessments through a foreclo-
sure, associations can either neglect the upkeep to save money or raise the as-
sessments for the paying homeowners.  Neither option seems just as it was 
“Fannie’s or Freddie’s servicer being asleep at the switch.”174 
In fact, Senators and members of the House felt the issue was so important 
that some members sent a letter to the Agency in 2016.175   The letter asked the 
Agency to solicit and consider public comments before starting its “no con-
sent” policy because “its new position could potentially affect millions of 
homeowners and thousands of loan servicers and community associations.”176  
Even further, the letter advocated that the Agency consider how its statutory 
purpose to ensure the “operations and activities of each regulated entity foster 
liquid, efficient, competitive, and resilient national housing finance markets” 
would be advanced by this “no consent” policy.177  The recognition of the im-
portance of this issue by Senators and members of the House furthers the posi-
tion that the Federal Foreclosure Bar defense should not be accepted, and state 
law priority rules should be upheld. 
 
 169. Winokur, supra note 52, at 361. 
 170. Wesley Blair, Opinion, Some Banks Are Siding with Condos in the Battle Over 
Super Liens, NAT’L MORTG. NEWS (June 14, 2016, 3:49 PM), https://www.national-
mortgagenews.com/opinion/some-banks-are-siding-with-condos-in-the-battle-over-
super-liens. 
 171. Henry L. Judy & Robert A. Wittie, Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key 
Issues, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 437, 475 (1978). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Blair, supra note 170. 
 174. Freyermuth & Whitman, supra note 47, at 32. 
 175. Letter from Several U.S. Senators & Members of Congress to Mel Watt, Dir., 
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency 3 (May 12, 2016), http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/docu-
ments/2016-5-12_MA_delegation_ltr_to_FHFA.pdf. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 4513(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012)). 
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Additionally, lenders are in a better position to safeguard their interests 
than are associations or third-party purchasers, such as Berezovsky.178  In fact, 
associations have been termed a “unit owner’s involuntary creditor.”179  Most 
associations cannot investigate and disapprove a potential homebuyer bor-
rower’s credit, whereas a lender can.180  To protect itself, a lender can investi-
gate the borrower, require an escrow for priority claims, control the loan-to-
value ratio, and demand notice of missed assessment payments so the lender 
can cover them.181 
Moreover, a lender can more easily preserve its security interest in the 
event of a default.182  A lender can easily secure its interest “by paying the 
delinquent amount and agreeing to pay common fees going forward, until the 
lender forecloses.”183  Alternatively, to make the process quicker, the associa-
tion could foreclose and the lender could attend the foreclosure, ensure high 
bids, and take the balance after the association’s assessments are paid.184 
Finally, as a practical matter, an association or a third-party buyer does 
not know to obtain consent from Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae when its interest 
is not recorded on the deed of trust.185  This creates an unavoidable trap for 
associations because Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae do not always record their 
interest on the deed of trust, and there is no process for obtaining Agency con-
sent.  Under the Federal Foreclosure Bar, the only way associations can pre-
serve their state law priority interest is to assume every mortgage might be 
owned by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae and to ask the Agency for consent.186  
Yet, as mentioned above, there is no process for obtaining consent.187  As a 
result, an association’s ability to enforce its state priority lien has now become 
an impossible burden. 
Therefore, in order to avoid the negative implications of the Federal Fore-
closure Bar on associations and their residents, Congress should amend the 
Federal Foreclosure Bar, create an exception to the Federal Foreclosure Bar for 
associations, or pass a statute that allows states to regulate priority lien laws 
for associations.  This would still allow lenders to safeguard their interests yet 
would also provide some protection for associations. 
 
 178. See Kylee Gloeckner, Note, Nevada’s Foreclosure Epidemic: Homeowner As-
sociations’ Super-Priority Liens Not So “Super” For Some, 15 NEV. L.J. 326, 345–46 
(2014). 
 179. Winokur, supra note 52, at 361. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id.; Judy & Wittie, supra note 171, at 481. 
 182. Winokur, supra note 52, at 361. 
 183. Blair, supra note 170. 
 184. Id. 
 185. In Berezovsky, the recorded deed of trust did not name Freddie Mac.  Berezov-
sky v. Moniz, 869 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 186. See Freyermuth & Whitman, supra note 47, at 28. 
 187. Id. at 29. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
In Berezovsky v. Moniz, the Ninth Circuit declared that an association 
cannot foreclose the priority portion of its lien without Agency consent.  By 
interpreting the Federal Foreclosure Bar to require the Agency’s consent – with 
no procedure for obtaining that consent – the Ninth Circuit has effectively 
taken away the association’s ability to foreclose, a right that it is entitled to 
under state law. 
To carry out the purpose of priority lien laws and place the burden where 
it belongs, the court should have denied the Federal Foreclosure Bar defense 
or held that the Agency and Freddie Mac have already impliedly consented to 
the foreclosures through their actions.  Instead, the Ninth Circuit bailed out the 
lenders.188   Now the burden lies on the associations and association members 
to upkeep the association community and the lenders’ collateral.  In dealing 
with the Federal Foreclosure Bar, Congress should act and create an exception 
to the Federal Foreclosure Bar or allow state law priority rules to be honored 




 188. See generally Berezovsky, 869 F.3d 923. 
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss2/10
